We investigate an economy in which¯rms have di®erent risks to go bankrupt. We observe two things:¯rst, workers in¯rms with higher bankruptcy risk (bad¯rms) always work less than workers in good¯rms. Second, the CEOs of bad¯rms may nonetheless receive larger wages.
Introduction
The compensation of chief executive o±cers (CEOs) is among the few economic topics that are capable of exciting the broad public. The Daily Telegraph (September 28, 2002) writes that \in America over the past 30 years or so, the average CEO's compensation has grown from 42 times that of the average workers to more than 400 times as much." Many people believe that CEOs do not deserve their oftentimes astronomic wages. They¯nd it particularly appalling when the very¯rms that pay the highest CEO wages end up in¯nancial trouble. This nurtures the belief that CEOs are awarded for poor performance. The recent case of the Swedish-Swiss multinational ABB provides an interesting example. The company paid 136 million USD worth of pensions as deferred compensation to two top managers when they left thē rm. Not much later, company performance declined; the stock price fell by 80%. It appears that the company took excessive risks, and Percy Barnevik, the former CEO, has been blamed for it. The company now asks the managers to pay back their compensation (Economist, 2002) .
Is it possible that CEOs get high compensation for bad work? We argue that there may be some truth in this perception, but that it needs some quali¯cation. Our point of departure is that the hierarchy of a¯rm and the career paths within can be understood as a tournament in which lower-level workers compete with each other for promotion. The¯nal prize is to become CEO. A substantial literature on tournaments and contests, (Rosen 1986 , Lazear and Rosen 1989, Knoeber and Thurman 1994, Ehrenberg and Bognanno 1998, Moldovanu and Sela 2001), investigates one tournament by the time and asks how the performance of agents (for instance, workers in¯rms, players in tennis tournaments) depends on the prize structure in the tournament. Our setting is di®erent: we consider a number of competing tournaments and consider that each of these tournament is a¯rm. Firms are heterogenous in their risk to go bankrupt and workers are indi®erent about which¯rm to enter. In this framework we investigate the performance (e®ort) of workers.
We show that,¯rst, workers in bad (high bankruptcy risk) companies always exert less life-time e®ort than workers in good (low bankruptcy risk) companies. Second, CEOs of bad companies may, indeed, receive higher wages than CEOs in good companies. However, this is only true concerning the ex post realized wages, not concerning the expected life-time income of workers, who compete for the CEO position. In our model, when the CEO of a bad¯rm receives better pay than the CEO of a good¯rms, a given worker's odds to become CEO in a bad¯rm are also smaller than his or her odds in a good¯rm.
The intuition for these observations is simple. Consider the simplest elimination tournament in which there are only two tiers in the¯rm's hierarchy: workers, and CEO. Agents are risk-neutral. They compete for the prize of becoming the CEO of thē rm. The¯rm pays zero wages to workers, while the CEO receives a strictly positive wage. A worker's odds of winning and thus becoming CEO increases in her own e®ort, and decreases in the e®orts of competing workers. In symmetric equilibrium, any worker has a chance of 1/N to win the tournament. Here, N is the number of workers competing for the prize of becoming CEO.
In order to understand the¯rst observation, consider what happens when a¯rm goes bankrupt. Then, it defaults on CEO wage payments. Thus, a worker anticipates that in addition to the risk of losing the tournament, there is an exogenous risk of not receiving the winner's prize when the¯rm goes bankrupt. The higher this bankruptcy risk, the lower the marginal bene¯t of exerting e®ort. Hence, it follows that workers in more risky, that is, less good¯rms, will exert less e®ort.
The second observation | CEOs in bad¯rms may receive larger wages than CEOs in good¯rms | requires the labor market (and product market) to be competitive. Then,¯rms make no pro¯t and the participation constraints of agents entering any given¯rm are binding. Consequently, the expected utility from working in a more or in a less risky¯rm (or for not working at all) must be the same. It can then readily be shown that situations exist in which CEOs in bad¯rms receive higher pay, although their worker exert less e®ort than their colleagues in good¯rms. As workers receive zero wages and¯rms make zero pro¯ts, the CEO receives the total output of the¯rm, that is, the sum of workers' outputs. The expected utility of any agent entering a¯rm is de¯ned as the probability to win the tournament (1/N) times the compensation of the CEO. In equilibrium only the expected chance of winning the tournament and the exerted e®ort are¯xed. However, there is a multitude of possible N's that satisfy the equilibrium conditions. In particular, it can occur that bad¯rms have more workers competing for the job of the CEO than good¯rms. Then, the probability to win the tournament is much lower, but the larger number of workers may overcompensate the lower e®ort in bad¯rms: CEOs in bad¯rms may receive higher wages than CEO's in good¯rms although their live-time e®ort is lower.
The Model
Suppose that there are many¯rms in the economy. Each¯rm has two levels: one CEO and a group of workers. Individuals are risk-neutral and live two periods. An individual chooses a¯rm in the¯rst period of her life. If she wins the tournament among workers in the¯rst period, she is promoted to be a CEO in the second period. When contracts contingent on output are infeasible, workers do not earn wages. Rather, their expected compensation consists of the CEO wage multiplied by the probability to win the tournament. All¯rms have the same production technology. They live in¯nitely and can commit themselves to pay the CEO wage unless they go bankrupt. Bankruptcy risk di®ers across¯rms. Firms hire new workers from the young generation at every time period.
Assume that there is perfect competition on the market and all¯rms earn zero pro¯t. We also make the following assumption about the disutility of e®ort e: A1: C (e)¸0, C 0 (e) > 0, C 00 (e) > 0, C 000 (e) > 0.
Individual k, who works in¯rm i, solves the following problem
The¯rst term is individual k's expected probability to win the tournament times the probability that¯rm i will survive until the next period (0 · ± i · 1) times the CEO wage. A good¯rm has a higher ± then a bad¯rm. The second term is the cost to exert e®ort e k . N i is the total number of workers on the lower level in¯rm i. N i and e k are to be determined in equilibrium. For simplicity we assume that there is no time discount.
The¯rst-order condition of the worker is
In symmetric equilibrium, it must be that all workers in¯rm i exert the same e®ort
Firm i produces output
l=1 e l at the normalized market price 1. Assume that the labor market is competitive. Then,¯rms earn zero pro¯ts, and the wage in¯rm i is:
In symmetric equilibrium:
. Inserting into equation (2) yields:
Note that the term in square brackets is a constant. We introduce an additional assumption ensuring that there exists a unique solution (greater than zero) of this equation as an intersection of concave function on the left-hand side and convex function on the right-hand side of equation (3):
Workers' individual rationality (IR) constraint must be satis¯ed in all¯rms:
Assuming that there is perfect competition on the supply side of the labor market, the (IR) is binding:
1 This assumption about function f (x) is consistent with the standard assumptions about contest success functions, see, for example, Skaperdas (1996) . A worker's expected payo® in symmetric equilibrium, given that¯rm i breaks even, is:
Moreover, given that individuals are indi®erent among¯rms to choose, they must have the same expected utility by entering any¯rm:
This involves that if¯rm i is \more risky" (less good) than¯rm j (± i < ± j ), it must be true that: e ¤ i < e ¤ j ; because ±e ¡ C (e) is a concave function (A1). We have thus proven the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Under assumptions A1 and A2, workers exert more e®ort in less risky¯rms, in symmetric equilibrium.
The intuition for this result follows from the following graph which plots the equation (4) We have shown that workers in more risky¯rm always work less than in less riskȳ rms. We now turn to the second observation: What can be said about number of workers and wages in two¯rms that have di®erent bankruptcy risks?
Notice¯rst that one can plot equation (3) in a similar graph as the one above by substituting C 0 (e) for C (e) (both are convex functions). As we have shown above, e ¤ i < e ¤ j . This implies that:
because a larger coe±cient
± i must correspond to the higher curve in the graph. However, condition (6) does not¯x the relationship between number of workers and di®erence in salaries in two¯rms. The two conditions, (6) and
can be satis¯ed for both N i < N j and N i > N j . If a more risky¯rm i has less workers than a less risky¯rm j (N i < N j ), it must be true that
This is a situation in which workers exert less e®ort in the more risky¯rm, less workers want to enter that¯rm, and the CEO gets a smaller wage. If a more risky¯rm employs more workers (N i > N j ), it may or may not pay a higher wage to the winner of the tournament. Actually, W i > W j holds if the positive e®ect of employing more workers outweighs the negative e®ect of lower per-capita e®ort. This observation is summarized in the second proposition. Proposition 2. Suppose that assumptions A1 and A2 hold. Then, in symmetric equilibrium the following is true:
² If a less risky¯rm employs more workers than a more risky¯rm, the CEO wage in a less risky¯rm is always higher wage than the CEO wage in a more riskȳ rm.
² If a less risky¯rm employs less workers than a more risky¯rm, the CEO in a less risky¯rm may have a lower wage than the CEO in a more risky¯rm.
Consider the following example which shows that a CEO in a more risky¯rm i may have a higher wage than in a less risky¯rm j .
Example. Suppose that f(x) = e x , C (x) = 1 3 x 3 . Suppose further that the bad¯rm's bankruptcy risk is 80% (± i = 0:2), the good¯rm's bankruptcy risk is 50% (± j = 0:5), and that the employment in the good and bad¯rm respectively is
